Files
nested-ratchets-artifact/verifpal/olm-fs.vp
2025-08-27 02:13:43 -04:00

117 lines
3.2 KiB
Plaintext

// proving authentication, confidentiality, and forward secrecy of Olm.
// closely follows: https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/blob/master/docs/olm.md
// signage is discussed here: https://gitlab.matrix.org/matrix-org/olm/-/blob/master/docs/signing.md
attacker[active]
principal Bob[
// initialize private key, ot key
generates bob_private, bob_ot_private
bob_ot_public = G^bob_ot_private
bob_public = G^bob_private
bob_ot_sig = SIGN(bob_private, bob_ot_public) // OPTIONAL
]
Bob -> Alice: [bob_public], bob_ot_public, bob_ot_sig
principal Alice[
// initialize private key, ot key
generates alice_private, alice_ot_private
alice_ot_public = G^alice_ot_private
alice_public = G^alice_private
alice_ot_sig = SIGN(alice_private, alice_ot_public) // OPTIONAL
knows public c0, c1, c2, c3, c4
_ = SIGNVERIF(bob_public, bob_ot_public, bob_ot_sig)?
k1a = bob_public^alice_private
k2a = bob_ot_public^alice_private
k3a = bob_public^alice_ot_private
// derive the master secret
sa = HASH(k1a, k2a, k3a, bob_public, alice_public)
// create the root and chain key from the 3DH'ed secret
ra1, ca1 = HKDF(sa, c1, c2)
// create ratchet key
generates ta1_private
ta1_public = G^ta1_private
ta1_sig = SIGN(alice_private, ta1_public)
// computing the first message key
mak1 = MAC(ca1, c3)
// ciphertext
generates ma1
xa1 = AEAD_ENC(mak1, ma1, CONCAT(alice_public, bob_public))
// signage not specified
xa1_sig = SIGN(alice_private, xa1)
]
// in the implementation we'd include a chain index, but since this is a model we do not
Alice -> Bob: [alice_public], alice_ot_public, alice_ot_sig, ta1_public, ta1_sig, xa1, xa1_sig
principal Bob[
_ = SIGNVERIF(alice_public, xa1, xa1_sig)
_ = SIGNVERIF(alice_public, alice_ot_public, alice_ot_sig)?
_ = SIGNVERIF(alice_public, ta1_public, ta1_sig)?
k1b = alice_public^bob_private
k2b = alice_public^bob_ot_private
k3b = alice_ot_public^bob_private
// derive master
knows public c0, c1, c2, c3, c4
sb = HASH(k1b, k2b, k3b, bob_public, alice_public)
// derive root and chain
rb1, cb1 = HKDF(sb, c1, c2)
// create bob's initial message key
mbk1 = MAC(cb1, c3)
// decrypt
mb1 = AEAD_DEC(mbk1, xa1, CONCAT(alice_public, bob_public))
// now, bob wants to send a message back and advances the ratchet
// generate new ratchet key
generates tb2_private
tb2_public = G^tb2_private
tb2_sig = SIGN(bob_private, tb2_public)
// advance the ratchet using prev root key, other ratchet stuff
rb2, cb2 = HKDF(rb1, ta1_public^tb2_private, c3)
// create message key
mbk2 = MAC(cb2, c3)
// ciphertext
generates mb2
xb2 = AEAD_ENC(mbk2, mb2, CONCAT(alice_public, bob_public))
]
Bob -> Alice: xb2, tb2_public
principal Alice[
// derive new root key
ra2, ca2 = HKDF(ra1, tb2_public^ta1_private, c3)
// derive new message key from the chain key
mak2 = MAC(ca2, c3)
// decrypt
ma2 = AEAD_DEC(mak2, xb2, CONCAT(alice_public, bob_public))
]
principal Bob[leaks bob_private]
// all four queries verify
queries[
confidentiality? ma1
authentication? Alice -> Bob: xa1
confidentiality? ma2
authentication? Bob -> Alice: xb2
]