48 lines
13 KiB
BibTeX
48 lines
13 KiB
BibTeX
@inproceedings{Pacheco2022, address={San Francisco, CA, USA}, title={Automated Attack Synthesis by Extracting Finite State Machines from Protocol Specification Documents}, ISBN={978-1-66541-316-9}, url={https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9833673/}, DOI={10.1109/SP46214.2022.9833673}, abstractNote={Automated attack discovery techniques, such as attacker synthesis or model-based fuzzing, provide powerful ways to ensure network protocols operate correctly and securely. Such techniques, in general, require a formal representation of the protocol, often in the form of a finite state machine (FSM). Unfortunately, many protocols are only described in English prose, and implementing even a simple network protocol as an FSM is time-consuming and prone to subtle logical errors. Automatically extracting protocol FSMs from documentation can significantly contribute to increased use of these techniques and result in more robust and secure protocol implementations.}, booktitle={2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)}, publisher={IEEE}, author={Pacheco, Maria Leonor and Hippel, Max Von and Weintraub, Ben and Goldwasser, Dan and Nita-Rotaru, Cristina}, year={2022}, month=may, pages={51–68}, language={en} }
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@article{Hippel2022, title={Automated Attacker Synthesis for Distributed Protocols}, url={http://arxiv.org/abs/2004.01220}, DOI={10.48550/arXiv.2004.01220}, abstractNote={Distributed protocols should be robust to both benign malfunction (e.g. packet loss or delay) and attacks (e.g. message replay) from internal or external adversaries. In this paper we take a formal approach to the automated synthesis of attackers, i.e. adversarial processes that can cause the protocol to malfunction. Specifically, given a formal threat model capturing the distributed protocol model and network topology, as well as the placement, goals, and interface (inputs and outputs) of potential attackers, we automatically synthesize an attacker. We formalize four attacker synthesis problems - across attackers that always succeed versus those that sometimes fail, and attackers that attack forever versus those that do not - and we propose algorithmic solutions to two of them. We report on a prototype implementation called KORG and its application to TCP as a case-study. Our experiments show that KORG can automatically generate well-known attacks for TCP within seconds or minutes.}, note={arXiv:2004.01220 [cs]}, number={arXiv:2004.01220}, publisher={arXiv}, author={von Hippel, Max and Vick, Cole and Tripakis, Stavros and Nita-Rotaru, Cristina}, year={2022}, month=apr }
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@book{clarke2000model,
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title = {Model Checking},
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author = {Clarke, Edmund M. and Grumberg, Orna and Peled, Doron A.},
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year = {2000},
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publisher = {MIT Press},
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address = {Cambridge, MA},
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isbn = {978-0-262-03270-4}
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}
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@inproceedings{vardi1986automata,
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title = {An Automata-Theoretic Approach to Automatic Program Verification},
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author = {Vardi, Moshe Y. and Wolper, Pierre},
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booktitle = {Proceedings of the First Annual Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS)},
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pages = {332--344},
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year = {1986},
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publisher = {IEEE},
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address = {Cambridge, MA},
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doi = {10.1109/LICS.1986.227466}
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}
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@inproceedings{Vardi_Wolper_1986, title={An Automata-Theoretic Approach to Automatic Program Verification}, ISBN={978-0-8186-0720-2}, url={https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/116609}, abstractNote={We describe an automata-theoretic approach to the automatic verification of concurrent finite-state programs by
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model checking.The basic idea underlying this approach is that for any temporal formula we can construct an automaton that accepts precisely the computations that satisfy the formula. The model-checking algorithm that results from this approach is much simpler and cleaner than tableau-based algorithms. We use this approach to extend model checking to probabilistic concurrent finite-state programs.
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concurrent finite-state programs.}, publisher={IEEE Computer Society}, author={Vardi, Moshe Y. and Wolper, Pierre}, year={1986}, language={English} }
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@inproceedings{Kozen_1977, address={Providence, RI, USA}, title={Lower bounds for natural proof systems}, url={http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/4567949/}, DOI={10.1109/SFCS.1977.16}, abstractNote={Two decidable logical theories are presented, one complete for deterministic polynomial time, one complete for polynomial space. Both have natural proof systems. A lower space bound of n/log(n) is shown for the proof system for the PTIME complete theory and a lower length bound of 2cn / 1og(n) is shown for the proof system for the PSPACE complete theory.}, booktitle={18th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (sfcs 1977)}, publisher={IEEE}, author={Kozen, Dexter}, year={1977}, month=sep, pages={254–266}, language={en} }
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@article{Holzmann_1997, title={The model checker SPIN}, volume={23}, rights={https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplorehelp/downloads/license-information/IEEE.html}, ISSN={00985589}, DOI={10.1109/32.588521}, abstractNote={SPIN is an efficient verification system for models of distributed software systems. It has been used to detect design errors in applications ranging from high-level descriptions of distributed algorithms to detailed code for controlling telephone exchanges. This paper gives an overview of the design and structure of the verifier, reviews its theoretical foundation, and gives an overview of significant practical applications.}, number={5}, journal={IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering}, author={Holzmann, G.J.}, year={1997}, month=may, pages={279–295}, language={en} }
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@article{Lamport_1994, title={The temporal logic of actions}, volume={16}, ISSN={0164-0925, 1558-4593}, DOI={10.1145/177492.177726}, abstractNote={The temporal logic of actions (TLA) is a logic for specifying and reasoning about concurrent systems. Systems and their properties are represented in the same logic, so the assertion that a system meets its specification and the assertion that one system implements another are both expressed by logical implication. TLA is very simple; its syntax and complete formal semantics are summarized in about a page. Yet, TLA is not just a logician’s toy; it is extremely powerful, both in principle and in practice. This report introduces TLA and describes how it is used to specify and verify concurrent algorithms. The use of TLA to specify and reason about open systems will be described elsewhere.}, number={3}, journal={ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems}, author={Lamport, Leslie}, year={1994}, month=may, pages={872–923}, language={en} }
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@article{Basin_Cremers_Dreier_Sasse_2022, title={Tamarin: Verification of Large-Scale, Real-World, Cryptographic Protocols}, volume={20}, rights={https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplorehelp/downloads/license-information/IEEE.html}, ISSN={1540-7993, 1558-4046}, DOI={10.1109/MSEC.2022.3154689}, abstractNote={Tamarin is a mature, state-of-the-art tool for cryptographic protocol verification. We introduce Tamarin and survey some of the larger, tour-de-force results achieved with it. We also show how Tamarin can formalize a wide range of protocols, adversary models, and properties, and scale to substantial, real-world, verification problems.}, number={3}, journal={IEEE Security & Privacy}, author={Basin, David and Cremers, Cas and Dreier, Jannik and Sasse, Ralf}, year={2022}, month=may, pages={24–32}, language={en} }
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@article{Blanchet_Smyth_Cheval_Sylvestre, title={ProVerif 2.05: Automatic Cryptographic Protocol Verifier, User Manual and Tutorial}, author={Blanchet, Bruno and Smyth, Ben and Cheval, Vincent and Sylvestre, Marc}, language={en} }
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@article{Kobeissi_Nicolas_Tiwari, title={Verifpal: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis for the Real World}, abstractNote={Verifpal is a new automated modeling framework and verifier for cryptographic protocols, optimized with heuristics for common-case protocol specifications, that aims to work better for real-world practitioners, students and engineers without sacrificing comprehensive formal verification features. In order to achieve this, Verifpal introduces a new, intuitive language for modeling protocols that is easier to write and understand than the languages employed by existing tools. Its formal verification paradigm is also designed explicitly to provide protocol modeling that avoids user error. Verifpal is able to model protocols under an active attacker with unbounded sessions and fresh values, and supports queries for advanced security properties such as forward secrecy or key compromise impersonation. Furthermore, Verifpal’s semantics have been formalized within the Coq theorem prover, and Verifpal models can be automatically translated into Coq as well as into ProVerif models for further verification. Verifpal has already been used to verify security properties for Signal, Scuttlebutt, TLS 1.3 as well as the first formal model for the DP-3T pandemic-tracing protocol, which we present in this work. Through Verifpal, we show that advanced verification with formalized semantics and sound logic can exist without any expense towards the convenience of real-world practitioners.}, author={Kobeissi, Nadim and Nicolas, Georgio and Tiwari, Mukesh}, language={en} }
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@article{Blanchet_Jacomme, title={CryptoVerif: a Computationally-Sound Security Protocol Verifier}, abstractNote={This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif. CryptoVerif does not rely on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy, correspondence properties (which include authentication), and indistinguishability properties. It produces proofs presented as sequences of games, like those manually written by cryptographers; these games are formalized in a probabilistic process calculus. CryptoVerif provides a generic method for specifying security properties of the cryptographic primitives. It produces proofs valid for any number of sessions of the protocol, and provides an upper bound on the probability of success of an attack against the protocol as a function of the probability of breaking each primitive and of the number of sessions. CryptoVerif is post-quantum sound: when the used cryptographic assumptions are valid for quantum adversaries, the proofs hold for quantum adversaries. It can work automatically, or the user can guide it with manual proof indications.}, author={Blanchet, Bruno and Jacomme, Charlie}, language={en} }
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@article{Clarke_Wang, title={25 Years of Model Checking}, abstractNote={Model Checking is an automatic verification technique for large state transition systems. It was originally developed for reasoning about finite-state concurrent systems. The technique has been used successfully to debug complex computer hardware, communication protocols, and software. It is beginning to be used for analyzing cyberphysical, biological, and financial systems as well. The major challenge for the technique is a phenomenon called the State Explosion Problem. This issue is impossible to avoid in the worst case; but, by using sophisticated data structures and clever search algorithms, it is now possible to verify state transition systems with an astronomical number of states. In this paper, we will briefly review the development of Model Checking over the past 32 years, with an emphasis on model checking stochastic hybrid systems.}, author={Clarke, Edmund M and Wang, Qinsi}, language={en} }
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@article{Basin_Linker_Sasse, title={A Formal Analysis of the iMessage PQ3 Messaging Protocol}, abstractNote={We report on the design and verification of a highly performant, device-to-device messaging protocol offering strong security guarantees even against an adversary with quantum computing capabilities, called iMessage PQ3. The protocol leverages Apple’s identity services together with a custom, post-quantum secure initialization phase and afterwards it employs constructs from a double ratchet in the style of Signal, extended to provide post-quantum, post-compromise security. We present a detailed formal model of the protocol, a precise specification of its fine-grained security properties, and machine-checked proofs using the Tamarin prover. Particularly novel are the integration of postquantum secure key encapsulation into the relevant protocol phases and the detailed security claims along with their complete formal analysis, covering both key ratchets, including unbounded loops.}, author={Basin, David and Linker, Felix and Sasse, Ralf}, language={en} }
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@article{Clarke_Wang, title={25 Years of Model Checking ?}, abstractNote={Model Checking is an automatic verification technique for large state transition systems. It was originally developed for reasoning about finite-state concurrent systems. The technique has been used successfully to debug complex computer hardware, communication protocols, and software. It is beginning to be used for analyzing cyberphysical, biological, and financial systems as well. The major challenge for the technique is a phenomenon called the State Explosion Problem. This issue is impossible to avoid in the worst case; but, by using sophisticated data structures and clever search algorithms, it is now possible to verify state transition systems with an astronomical number of states. In this paper, we will briefly review the development of Model Checking over the past 32 years, with an emphasis on model checking stochastic hybrid systems.}, author={Clarke, Edmund M and Wang, Qinsi}, language={en} }
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