\korg is an implementation of the theoretical attack synthesis framework proposed by \cite{Hippel2022_anonym}. This framework enjoys soundness and completeness guarantees for attacks discovered; that is, if there exists an attack, it is discovered, and if an attack is discovered, it is valid. However, the attack synthesis framework proposed by \cite{Hippel2022_anonym} reasons about an abstracted, theoretical process construct. Therefore, in order to correctly claim \korg is also sound and complete, it is necessary to demonstrate discovering an attack within the theoretical framework reduces to the semantics of \spin, the model checker \korg is built on top of.

%There exists a semantic gap between the theoretical attack synthesis framework proposed by \cite{Hippel2022_anonym}, and the semantics of \korg. Therefore, in order to correctly claim \korg maintains the soundness and completeness of the theoretical framework it implements, it suffices to demonstrate finding an attack within the theoretical attack synthesis framework precisely reduces to the semantics of \spin.
%the model checker \korg is implemented on top of.

\begin{definition}[\ba]
A \ba is a tuple \( B = (Q, \Sigma, \delta, Q_0, F) \) where:
\begin{itemize}
    \item \( Q \) is a finite set of states,
    \item \( \Sigma \) is a finite alphabet,
    \item \( \delta \subseteq Q \times \Sigma \times Q \) is a transition relation,
    \item \( Q_0 \subseteq Q \) is a set of initial states,
    \item \( F \subseteq Q \) is a set of accepting states.
\end{itemize}
A run of a \ba is an infinite sequence of states \( q_0, q_1, q_2, \ldots \) such that \( q_0 \in Q_0 \) and \( (q_i, a, q_{i+1}) \in \delta \) for some \( a \in \Sigma \) at each step \( i \). The run is considered accepting if it visits states in \( F \) infinitely often.
\end{definition}

\begin{definition}[Process]
A \emph{Process} is a tuple \( P = \langle AP, I, O, S, s_0, T, L \rangle \), where:
\begin{itemize}
    \item \( AP \) is a finite set of atomic propositions,
    \item \( I \) is a set of inputs,
    \item \( O \) is a set of output, such that \( I \cap O = \emptyset \),
    \item \( S \) is a finite set of states,
    \item \( s_0 \in S \) is the initial state,
    \item \( T \subseteq S \times (I \cup O) \times S \) is the transition relation,
    \item \( L: S \to 2^{AP} \) is a labeling function mapping each state to a subset of atomic propositions.
\end{itemize}
A transition \( (s, x, s') \in T \) is called an \emph{input transition} if \( x \in I \) and an \emph{output transition} if \( x \in O \).
\end{definition}

\setcounter{theorem}{0} 
\begin{theorem}
  A process, as defined in \cite{Hippel2022_anonym}, always directly corresponds to a \ba.
\end{theorem}

\begin{proof}

Given a \ba \( B = (Q, \Sigma, \delta, Q_0, F) \), we construct a corresponding Process \( P = \langle AP, I, O, S, s_0, T, L \rangle \) as follows:

\begin{itemize}
    \item Atomic Propositions: \( AP = \{ \text{accept} \} \), a singleton set containing a special proposition indicating acceptance.
    \item Inputs and Outputs: \( I = \Sigma \) and \( O = \emptyset \).
    \item States: \( S = Q \) and \( s_0 \in Q_0 \).
    \item Transition Relation: \( T = \delta \).
    \item Labeling Function: \( L: S \to 2^{AP} \) defined by
\end{itemize}
\[        
  L(s) = 
  \begin{cases}            
  \{ \text{accept} \} & \text{if } s \in F, \\            
  \emptyset & \text{otherwise}.        
  \end{cases}    
\]

In this mapping, the states and transitions of the BA are preserved in the Process, and the accepting states \( F \) are identified via the labeling function \( L \).

Conversely, given a Process \( P = \langle AP, I, O, S, s_0, T, L \rangle \) with an acceptance condition defined by a distinguished proposition \( p \in AP \), we define a \ba \( B = (Q, \Sigma, \delta, Q_0, F) \) as follows:

\begin{itemize}
    \item States: \( Q = S \) and \( Q_0 = \{ s_0 \} \).
    \item Alphabet: \( \Sigma = I \cup O \).
    \item Transition Relation: \( \delta = T \).
    \item Accepting States: \( F = \{ s \in S \mid p \in L(s) \} \).
\end{itemize}

Here, the accepting states in the BA correspond to those states in the Process that are labeled with the distinguished proposition \( p \).

In both structures, a run is an infinite sequence of states connected by transitions:

\begin{itemize}
    \item In the \ba: \( q_0, q_1, q_2, \ldots \) with \( q_0 \in Q_0 \) and \( (q_i, a_i, q_{i+1}) \in \delta \) for some \( a_i \in \Sigma \).
    \item In the Process: \( s_0, s_1, s_2, \ldots \) with \( s_0 = s_0 \) and \( (s_i, x_i, s_{i+1}) \in T \) for some \( x_i \in I \cup O \).
\end{itemize}

An accepting run in the \ba visits states in \( F \) infinitely often. Similarly, an accepting run in the Process visits states labeled with \( p \) infinitely often. Since \( F = \{ s \in S \mid p \in L(s) \} \), the acceptance conditions are preserved under the mappings.
  \end{proof}

\begin{definition}[Threat Model]
A threat model is a tuple \( (P, (Q_i)_{i=0}^m, \phi) \) where:
\begin{itemize}
    \item \( P, Q_0, \ldots, Q_m \) are processes.
    \item Each process \( Q_i \) has no atomic propositions (i.e., its set of atomic propositions is empty).
    \item \( \varphi \) is an LTL formula such that \( P \parallel Q_0 \parallel \cdots \parallel Q_m \models \phi \).
    \item The system \( P \parallel Q_0 \parallel \cdots \parallel Q_m \) satisfies the formula \( \phi \) in a non-trivial manner, meaning that \( P \parallel Q_0 \parallel \cdots \parallel Q_m \) has at least one infinite run.
\end{itemize}
\end{definition}

\begin{theorem}
  Checking whether there exists an attacker under a given threat model, the R-$\exists$ASP problem as proposed in \cite{Hippel2022_anonym}, is equivalent to B\"uchi Automata language inclusion (which is in turn solved by the \spin model checker).
\end{theorem}

\begin{proof}
  For a given threat model \( (P, (Q_i)_{i=0}^m, \phi) \), checking $\exists ASP$ is equivalent to checking
  \[
  R = MC(P \mid \mid \text{Daisy}(Q_0) \mid \mid \ldots \mid \mid \text{Daisy}(Q_m), \phi)
  \] 
  Where $MC$ is a model checker, and Daisy($Q_i$) is for intents of this proof, equivalent to a process. Therefore, via the previous theorem we can construct \ba \( BA_{P}, BA_{\text{Daisy}(Q_0)}, \ldots, BA_{\text{Daisy}(Q_m)} \) from the processes \( P, \text{Daisy}(Q_0), \ldots ,\text{Daisy}(Q_m) \). Then, we check
  \[
    \text{\spin}(BA_{P} \mid \mid BA_{\text{Daisy}(Q_0)} \mid \mid \ldots \mid \mid BA_{\text{Daisy}(Q_m)}, \phi)
  \] 
  Or equivalently, translating $\phi$ to the equivalent \ba $BA_{\phi}$ via \cite{Holzmann_1997}, we equivalently check
  \[
    \left(BA_{P} \mid \mid BA_{\text{Daisy}(Q_0)} \mid \mid \ldots \mid \mid BA_{\text{Daisy}(Q_m)}\right) \subseteq BA_{\phi}
  \] 
Where rendezvous composition for I/O \ba is precise the same as for I/O Kripke Automata; that is, input and output transitions are matched. It's easy to see these composition operations are equivalent.
\end{proof}

\begin{theorem}
  Checking whether there exists an attacker for a given threat model, the R-$\exists$ASP problem as proposed in \cite{Hippel2022_anonym}, is in PSPACE.
\end{theorem}

\begin{proof}
By the previous argument the $\exists$ASP problem corresponds to \ba language inclusion, which is well-known to be PSPACE-complete \cite{Kozen_1977}.
\end{proof}
