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sections/case_studies.tex

@@ -109,6 +109,10 @@ Dropping AppendEntryResponse messages & no \\
 \end{figure}
 In our experiments, we found just one attack on our \texttt{raft-bug.pml} \promela model, violating election safety in particular. In this scenario, peer A and peer B are candidates for election. Peer A receives three votes, one from itself and two from other peers, and Peer B receives two votes, one from itself and one from another peer. The replay attacker simply replays the vote sent to peer B. Then, both Peer A and Peer B are convinced they won the election and change their state to leader. Following this, leader completeness is also naturally violated. In this scenario, \korg demonstrates its ability to discover subtle bugs in protocol logic, exploiting the buggy Raft implementation. 
 
+\subsection{SCTP}%
+\label{sub:SCTP}
+SCTP is a transport-layer protocol proposed as an alternative to TCP, featuring a four-way handshake, multi-homing, and multi-streaming. Among other use cases, SCTP is the data transfer protocol for various telecoms signaling protocols as well as WebRTC. For our analysis, we borrow the ten LTL properties and \promela models derived from the SCTP RFCs as described in \cite{Ginesin2024}. We evaluated the SCTP \promela model against \korg's drop, replay, and reordering attacker models on a single uni-directional communication channel. SCTP is designed to resist these attacker models, and we employ \korg to exhaustively demonstrate this is the case.
+
 %our Raft model satisfies $\phi_1$-$\phi_5$ assuming perfect channels, and \korg allowed us to reason precisely about the effect of imperfect, vulnerable channels.