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2025-03-03 23:52:29 -05:00
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sections/case_studies.tex
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@@ -111,7 +111,9 @@ In our experiments, we found just one attack on our \texttt{raft-bug.pml} \prome
\subsection{SCTP}%
\label{sub:SCTP}
SCTP is a transport-layer protocol proposed as an alternative to TCP, featuring a four-way handshake, multi-homing, and multi-streaming. Among other use cases, SCTP is the data transfer protocol for various telecoms signaling protocols as well as WebRTC. For our analysis, we borrow the ten LTL properties and \promela models derived from the SCTP RFCs as described in \cite{Ginesin2024}. We evaluated the SCTP \promela model against \korg's drop, replay, and reordering attacker models on a single uni-directional communication channel. SCTP is designed to resist these attacker models, and we employ \korg to exhaustively demonstrate this is the case.
SCTP is a transport-layer protocol proposed as an alternative to TCP, featuring a four-way handshake, multi-homing, and multi-streaming. Among other use cases, SCTP is the data transfer protocol for various telecoms signaling protocols as well as WebRTC. For our analysis, we borrow the ten LTL properties and \promela models derived from the SCTP RFCs as described in \cite{Ginesin2024}. We evaluated the SCTP \promela model against \korg's drop, replay, and reordering attacker models on a single uni-directional communication channel. The drop attacker model was specified to max out at three dropped packets, while the replay and reordering attacker model was specified to max out at two packets. SCTP is designed to resist drop, replay, and reordering attackers \cite{rfc9260}, and we employ \korg to exhaustively demonstrate this is the case.
% these attacker models, and we employ \korg to exhaustively demonstrate this is the case.
%our Raft model satisfies $\phi_1$-$\phi_5$ assuming perfect channels, and \korg allowed us to reason precisely about the effect of imperfect, vulnerable channels.